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I INTRODUCTION 
1. The formation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 1 has led to the 
first international judicial proceedings against perpetrators of serious international 
crimes since the end of the Second World War. Since their formation there has been 
further progress at the international level aimed at ending impunity for international 
criminals. These include the agreement to form an International Criminal Court 
1 The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia <http://www.un.org/icty/index.html> 
(last accessed 20 July 2001) [ICTY]; International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
<http://www.ictr.org/> (last accessed 10 June 2001) [ICTR]. The ICTY was created pursuant to the 
Security Council Resolution 827 of 25 May 1993 <http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/S-RES-
827 _93.htm> (last accessed 12 August 2001); the ICTR was created by the Security Council 
Resolution 955 of 8 November 1994 <http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/Resolutions/955e.htm> (last 
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(ICC),2 and the formation of other tribunals for trying offenders in Sierra Leone and 
Cambodia.3 
2. This renewed international effort to bring the perpetrators of senous 
international crimes to justice is the concern of all States. The ICTY and ICTR were 
established under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, so all states are under an 
international obligation to cooperate with them. States-parties to the ICC will be under 
international obligations, defined in the ICC Statute, to cooperate with that court once 
it is established. Under some international treaties and conventions, including the ICC 
Statute, States-parties are required to establish domestic jurisdiction over offenders.4 
These developments are positive steps towards ending impunity for serious 
international criminals. 
3. It is in this context that this paper will examine the implications of a Belgrade 
Court issuing international arrest warrants for Bill Clinton and Tony Blair for alleged 
crimes during the Kosovo campaign. The Belgrade court issued international arrest 
warrants against all of the civilian leaders of the NATO countries which had 
participated in the bombing campaign. The warrants alleged criminal responsibility 
for the commission of serious international crimes, including genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes. The international developments in this area make it a 
useful exercise to consider whether Tony Blair and Bill Clinton could be held 
criminally liable for any international crimes that may have been committed by 
NATO during Operation Allied Force. 
4. The issues of international law that this scenano raises revolve principally 
around two international law doctrines: the doctrine of command responsibility and 
accessed 12 August 2001) . Both tribunals were established under Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
<http://www.unhcr.ch/html/menu3/b/ch-cont.htm> (last accessed 12 August 2001) . 
2 The ratification status of the Statute of the International Criminal Court as at 28 June 2001 is 139 
signatures and 36 parties (including New Zealand) <http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/status.htm> (last 
accessed 20 July 2001) . The Statute requires 60 ratifications before entry into force: Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998 (1998) 37 ILM 998, Article 126 [ICC Statute]. 
3 Penny Gleeson "Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a Special Court For Sierra 
Leone: Summary" Australian Red Cross 
<http://www.redcross .org.au/ihl/special_documentation/sierra_leone_1200.htm> (last accessed 10 
August 2001); Michael P Scharf "The Special Court for Sierra Leone" (October 2001) ASIL Insights 
<http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh53.htm> (last accessed 10 August 2001); UN News Service "UN 
to review draft law on special court to try Khmer Rouge leaders" 10 August 2001 
<http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/page2.htm1#9> (last accessed 11 August 2001). 
4 For example: Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (10 December 1984) 1465 UNTS 85 Article 5 [Torture Convention 1984]; Convention on 
3 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. This is due to the fact that, with the possible 
exception of the crime of aggression, neither Clinton nor Blair could have been the 
actual perpetrators of any offence. Neither leader actually dropped any bombs or 
launched any missiles that caused civilian deaths. Any criminal liability that the two 
may be exposed to will be via the doctrine of command responsibility, for either 
directly ordering or planning acts that were international crimes, or through an 
omission-based liability for failing to prevent or punish any crimes committed by 
subordinates under their effective control. Even if criminal liability is established via 
command responsibility both men enjoy immunity by virtue of the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity, and it will need to be established how this doctrine interrelates to 
the notion of individual criminal responsibility at international law. 
5. This paper will first determine the content of the doctrine of command 
responsibility at customary international law, and how it pertains to civilian leaders. 
The doctrine can then be applied to Clinton and Blair, with respect to some of the 
alleged criminal incidents from the Kosovo campaign. Finally the impact of the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity on their potential criminal liability under the doctrine 
of command responsibility will be considered. 
6. This paper will not examine the issue of whether NATO, and the NATO leaders 
who made the decision to use force, may have committed the crime of aggression. It is 
worth noting that the content and scope of the crime of aggression is the subject of 
some controversy in the international community,5 and that politicians and 
international lawyers alike dispute the legality of NATO's intervention in Kosovo.
6 
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) has brought cases before the International 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (9 December 1948) 78 UNTS 277, Article 5 
[Genocide Convention 1948]. 
5 The signatories of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court were unable to agree on the 
definition of the crime of aggression and its inclusion in the Statute, with the result that it was excluded 
until a review of the Statute seven years after entry into force: ICC Statute, above n2 , Articles 5(2), 121 
and 123. 
6 For example: Sergey Egorov, Professor of International Law at the Diplomatic Academy of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow, rejects any right of humanitarian intervention without 
authorisation by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter, Sergey Alexeyevich Egorov 
"The Kosovo Crisis and the Law of Armed Conflicts" (31 March 2000) International Review of the 
Red Cross No 837, 183 
<http://www.icrc.org/icrceng.nsf/4dc394db5b54f3fa4l2567390024lt2f/002b6188e758f33b412568d40 
028cf8d?OpenDocument> (last accessed 20 July 2001); Law and Right: When They Don 't Fit Together 
ECONOMIST April 3 1999, 19 - 20. 
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Court of Justice (ICJ) against the participating NATO countries.7 If the ICJ makes a 
decision on the merits of these cases that may provide some needed clarification of 
where international law stands on the use of force for humanitarian intervention. 
II INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AND NATO: GENOCIDE, WAR 
CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY? 
7. There have been allegations from a variety of sources that NATO committed a 
number of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity during the Kosovo 
war. 8 Amnesty International produced a report, 9 based on the work done by Human 
Rights Watch 10 and allegations by the FRY authorities, which alleged war crimes 
relating to a number of specific attacks on civilians. In response to these allegations 
the Office of the Tribunal Prosecutor (OTP) at the ICTY conducted an investigation 
into the allegations and produced a report that found insufficient evidence of any war 
crimes to justify proceeding with further investigation. 11 The report considers general 
accusations in relation to over 24 incidents, and then considers five particular 
incidents that "were the most problematic." 12 This paper will consider the possible 
liability for Clinton and Blair via the doctrine of command responsibility for three of 
these "problematic" incidents. 
8. The OTP Final Report only considered allegations of war cnmes against 
NATO. Wider allegations have been advanced against NATO, including allegations 
of genocide and crimes against humanity. Neither of these allegations can be 
sustained, as the threshold requirements for these offences are not met. 
7 Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium) (Yugoslavia v. Canada) (Yugoslavia v. France) 
(Yugoslavia v. Germany) (Yugoslavia v. Italy) (Yugoslavia v. Netherlands) (Yugoslavia v. Portugal) 
(Yugoslavia v. United Kingdom). Any substantive judgement on the merits of the case is a long way 
off, with the ICJ recently extending the time limit for parties memorials and counter-memorials on a 
preliminary objection to jurisdiction by the eight defendant States until 5 April 2002, ICJ Press Release 
2001/05 23 February 2001 <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/ipress2001/ipresscom200l-
05_yugo_200l0223.htm> (last accessed 16 July 2001). 
8 For example, Tania Yoon "Pointing the Finger: Civilian Casualties of NATO Bombing in the Kosovo 
Conflict (2001) 16 Am U Int'l Rev 1083; see also the "indictment" drawn up by the former US 
Attorney General Ramsey Clark, naming both Clinton and Blair along with numerous others, charging 
them with various crimes on behalf of the International Action Centre (IAC) 
<http://www.iacenter.org/warcrime/indictmt.htm> (last accessed 21 August 2001 ). 
9 NATO/Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: "Collateral Damage" or Unlawful Killings? Violations of the 
Laws of War by NATO during Operation Allied Force (EUR 70/018/2000) [Amnesty Report] 
<http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/Index/EUR700l82000> (last accessed on 1 July 2001) . 
1° Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign, February 2000 
<http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato/index.htm> (last accessed on 1 July 2001). 
11 Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing 
Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, para 90 [OTP Final Report] 
<http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/nato06l300.htm> (last accessed on l July 2001) . 
s 
9. Genocide involves specified acts "committed with the intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group". 13 There is no evidence 
to suggest that NATO had any such intent, in fact the evidence is that they acted to 
prevent what they believed to be such acts on the part of the FRY. 
10. The ICTY has conducted the first prosecutions for crimes against humanity by 
an international tribunal since the proceedings at the end of the Second World War. 
Crimes against humanity are included in the ICTY Statute at Article 5. 14 The ICTY in 
the Tadic Case 15 has interpreted Article 5 of its Statute so that in order to constitute a 
crime against humanity acts must occur within the context of an armed conflict; be 
linked geographically or temporally with that conflict; the act must not be unrelated to 
the conflict, such as for personal motives; and the act must occur as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population. 16 The Trial Chamber was of 
the opinion that the requirement for an armed conflict in the ICTY Statute narrowed 
the customary international law position, 17 as consideration of other international 
instruments and jurisprudence illustrates that in customary law there is no requirement 
for "an armed conflict." 
11. In the ICC Statute crimes against humanity must be committed in the context of 
a "wide-spread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with 
knowledge of the attack," 18 though the attack does not have to be military in nature, 
and therefore presumably there is no need for an armed conflict as a contextual 
requirement. 19 The ICTR Statute does not have a requirement in its Article 3 for the 
existence of an armed conflict.20 The International Law Commission ' s (ILC)2 1 Draft 
12 OTP Final Report, above nl 1, para 57 . 
13 Genocide Convention 1948, above n2, Article 2. 
14 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, as amended 30 November 
2000 by Resolution 1329 [ICTY Statute] <http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/stat2000_con.htm> (last 
accessed 16 August 200 l ). 
15 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic a.k.a "Dute" Trial Chamber Judgement IT-94-1 (ICTY, 7 May 1997) 
[Tadic Case] <http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/judgement/index.htm> (last accessed 8 July 2001) . 
16 Tadic Case, above nl5, paras 618 - 659. 
17 Tadic Case, above nl5, para 627. 
18 ICC Statute, above n2, Article 7. 
19 Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Addendum Part II, 
Finalized draft text of the Elements of Crimes (2 November 2000) PCNICC/2000/1/ Add.2, 9 [ICC 
Draft Elements of Crimes] 
<http://www.un.org/la w/icc/statute/elements/engl ish/ l_add2e.pdf#pagemode=bookmarks> (last 
accessed 15 August 2001). 
20 "The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the 
following crimes when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian 
population on national , political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds . .. " Statute of the International 
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Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Manlcind (ILC Draft Code) outlines 
the contextual requirements for crimes against humanity in Article 18, as "committed 
in a systematic manner or on a large scale and instigated or directed by a Government 
or by any organisation or group."22 The ILC in its commentary rejects the requirement 
for a connection to an armed conflict or war crimes for the proscribed acts to 
constitute crimes against humanity. 23 Having regard to the jurisprudence of the 
ICTY,24 the ICTR, and the various international instruments discussed above, the 
contextual requirements for crimes against humanity are that the act was part of a 
widespread and systematic attack on a civilian population, and that the perpetrator 
knew that the act was part of that attack. 
12. The evidence of the nature and intent of NATO operations does not support any 
claim that they constituted a systematic or widespread attack on a civilian population. 
As the OTP Final Report notes, out of some 10,484 strike sorties by NATO aircraft, 
releasing 23,614 air munitions, only around 90 incidents have been documented that 
involved civilian deaths (0.9% of all strikes missions).25 The first alternative 
requirement, a systematic attack, means attacks "pursuant to a preconceived plan or 
policy."26 The contextual requirement of an "attack on a civilian population" is 
understood as attacks as part of a State or organisational policy of attack on that 
civilian population.27 There is no evidence that NATO had a policy or plan to target 
civilians. In fact all the evidence, including the statistics quoted above, tend to 
establish that NATO policy and planning was predicated on avoiding civilian 
casualties as far as was possible. The individual incidents alleged by the FRY to 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Article 3 [ICTR Statute] 
<http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html> (last accessed 10 August 2001) . 
21 The International Law Commission was established by the General Assembly in 1947 to promote the 
progressive development of international law and its codification (Article 13(1) of the Charter of the 
United Nations) <http://www.un.org/law/ilc/introfra.htm> (last accessed 9 August 2001). 
22 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind 1996 Art 18 [ILC Draft Code] 
<http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/dcodefra.htm> (last accessed l April 2001). The Draft Code was 
provisionally adopted in 1988: Regina v Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and 
Others, Ex Parte Pinochet; Regina v Evans and Another and the Commissioner of Police for the 
Metropolis and Others, Ex Parte Pinochet (1999] UKHL 17, paras 83 - 84 per Lord Goff [Pinochet] . 
23 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session (6 May-26 July 
1996) General Assembly Official Records - Fifty-first Session Supplement No. 10 (A/51/10), Chapter 
II, commentary on Art 18, para 6 [ILC Report 1996] 
<http://www.un.org/law/ilc/reports/l996/96repfra.htm> (last accessed 15 August 2001) . 
24 Which acknowledges that its requirement for an "armed conflict", dictated by the wording of its 
Statute, narrows the customary international law position, above nl 7. 
25 OTP Final Report, above nl 1, para 54. 
26 ILC Report 1996, above n23, commentary on Article 18 para 3. 
27 ICC Draft Elements of Crimes, above n19, 9. 
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constitute crimes against humanity do not occur m the necessary context, and 
therefore do not meet the threshold requirement. 
13. The last category that the incidents may fall under is that of war crimes, 
violations by NATO of the laws and customs of war. These are codified to a certain 
extent in international treaties and instruments such as the Geneva Conventions, and 
their protocols, and the Hague Conventions. The laws and customs of war also form 
part of international customary law. In the context of NATO's attack on the FRY the 
threshold requirement of an international conflict is met for the full application of all 
of the laws and customs of war. 
14. As the focus of this essay is on the liability of Clinton and Blair via the doct1ine 
of command responsibility, this paper will not examine the lawfulness of the various 
incidents alleged to be violations of the laws and customs of law. Instead three 
specific incidents will be assumed to be primafacie war crimes for the purposes of the 
discussion of command responsibility and sovereign immunity:
28 
(a) The attack on a civilian passenger train at the Grdelica Gorge on 12 April 
1999.29 A NATO aircraft fired two missiles at a bridge, hitting a train and 
killing as many as 12 civilians. The second missile was fired after the train 
had been hit and identified by the pilot, aimed at a different part of the 
smoke-obscured bridge. The train had slid forward and was hit again. This 
will be assumed to be a grave breach of the First Protocol, Article 
85(3)(b),30 characterised as an "indiscriminate" attack. 
3 1 
28 Despite the OTP findings that there was insufficient evidence to warrant further investigation over 
these incidents there is still opinion that these incidents did in fact constitute breaches of the laws of 
war. For example see Yoon, above n8; A "tribunal" convened by the IAC, see above n8, found NATO 
"guilty" of a number of war crimes at a mock trial held in New York on 10 June 2000, IAC "War 
Crimes Tribunal Finds US and NATO Guilty" (6 December 2000) 
<http ://www.iacenter.org/warcrime/wct2000.htm> (last accessed 21 August 2001). 
<http://www.iacenter.org/index.htm> (last accessed 21 August 2001) . 
29 OTP Final Report, above n 11, paras 58 - 62; Amnesty Report, above n9 , section 5. l. 
30 "(3) The following acts shall be regarded as grave breaches, when committed wilfully, in violation of 
the relevant provisions of this Protocol, and causing death ... (b) launching an indiscriminate attack 
affecting the civilian population or civilian objects in the knowledge that such attack will cause 
excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects . . . " Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (June 8 1977) 1125 UNTS 3 Article 85 [First Protocol]. 
31 First Protocol, above n30, Article 51(4) - 51(5) defines an "indiscriminate" attack. Arguably these 
attacks, in failing to comply with the precautionary measures mandated under Article 57, may have 
shaded into indiscriminate attacks either in terms of Article 51(4)(a) or 51(4)(c). 
8 
(b) The second incident is the attack on the convoys at Djakovica on 14 April 
1999.32 NATO aircraft bombed two separate columns of refugees after 
they misidentified them as military convoys. As many as 70 civilians may 
have been killed and over 100 wounded. This will be assumed to be a 
grave breach of the First Protocol, Article 85(3)(b), characterised as an 
"indiscriminate" attack. 33 
(c) The last incident is the attack on Serbian State Television and Radio 
(RTS) on 23 April 1999.34 At least 16 civilians were killed and another 16 
wounded in this attack. This could be a violation of either the First 
Protocol, Article 85(3)(a),35 making the civilian population the object of 
attack, if RTS was not a military objective;36 or the First Protocol, Article 
85(3)(b), if the attack was characterised as an "indiscriminate" attack. 
III THE DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY 
15. Assuming that the three incidents outlined above are prima facie war crimes 
can criminal liability be attributed to Clinton and Blair? In each instance the actual 
attack was conducted by unidentified coalition aircraft, operating under orders from 
their immediate commanders, orders passed through the chain of command from 
NATO command. As a former Head of State and a current Head of Government 
respectively, the question is whether they can be held criminally liable through the 
doctrine of command responsibility for these incidents. 
16. The first formal recognition of a duty for military commanders to prevent and 
punish violations of the laws of war by their subordinates is arguably in the 1907 
Hague Conventions .37 The idea that military commanders, and even civilian leaders, 
32 OTP Final Report, above nl 1, paras 63 - 70; Amnesty Report, above n9, section 5.2. 
33 Above, n3 l. 
34 OTP Final Report, above nll, paras 71 - 79; Amnesty Report, above n9, section 5.3. 
35 "85 ... (3) the following acts shall be regarded as grave breaches, when committed wilfully, in 
violation of the relevant provisions of this Protocol, and causing death . .. (a) making the civilian 
~opulation or individual civilians the object of attack," First Protocol, above n30, Article 85 . 
6 Military Objects are defined in the First Protocol, above n30, Article 52(2). 
37 "Undoubtedly ... the Hague Conventions IV (1907) 5 and X (1907) 6 created affirmative command 
duties in relation to the conduct of subordinate persons, establishing the doctrine of 'command 
responsibility'" Ilias Bantekas "The Contemporary Law of Superior Responsibility" 93 AHL 573, 573; 
Andrew D Mitchell "Failure to Halt, Prevent or Punish: The Doctrine of Command Responsibility for 
War Crimes" 22 Sydney L Rev 381 , 383 - 384. 
9 
might be held criminally liable for violations of the laws and customs of war by their 
subordinates was canvassed as early as the close of World War One: 38 
There remain, however, a number of charges ... against all authorities, civil or military, 
belonging to enemy countries, however high their position may have been, without 
distinction of rank, including the heads of states, who ordered, or with knowledge 
thereof and with power to intervene, abstained from preventing or taking measures to 
prevent, putting an end to or repressing, violations of the laws or customs of war. .. 
The recommended "high tribunal" for the trial of these and other charges39 did not 
eventuate. It was not until the trials of war criminals following the Second World War 
that this doctrine of command responsibility was applied. The Charter of the Ni.imberg 
Tribunal did not fully incorporate the doctrine of command responsibility,40 and 
proceeded only on the basis of direct liability for the highest Nazi officials. It was the 
Tokyo Tribunal, in the Yamashita case,41 that first convicted a superior for his 
responsibility in failing to prevent or punish crimes of his subordinates. Subsequent 
proceedings in Europe against German commanders and officials also proceeded on 
the basis of this indirect liability.42 Following the trials in Ni.imberg and Tokyo it was 
not immediately clear to contemporaries what the full scope of the doctrine was in 
terms of responsibility for failure by superiors to prevent or punish war crimes.43 The 
introduction into the 1977 First Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of duties on 
commanders were not only " ... uncontested during the deliberations for the adoption 
38 Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on the Enforcement of Penalties, 
Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference (1920) 14 AJIL 95, 121 [Commission on 
Responsibility Report]. 
39 Commission on Responsibility Report, above n38, 122 - 123. 
40 Article 6 of the Charter provides that "Leaders, organisers, instigators and accomplices participating 
in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes 
are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan." Agreement for the 
Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal. London, 8 August 1945 [Nlirnberg Charter] 
<http://www.icrc.org/ihl. nsf/385ec082b509e 7 6c4 l 256739003e636d/59e5 a3f396d98cc3c 125641 e00405 
ea7?0penDocument> (last accessed 9 August 2001). This incorporates the first limb of command 
responsibility as discussed below, liability for positive acts, but makes no mention of liability for 
omission to prevent or punish, or indirect liability. 
41 Yamashita Vol IV Law Reports, 1. 
42 Bantekas, above n37, 573 - 574; Greg R Vetter "Command Responsibility of Non-Military Superiors 
in the International Criminal Court" (2000) 25 Yale J Int'l L 89, 95. 
43 "No clear rule has emerged as to the extent to which a civil or military superior can be convicted of 
failing to prevent crimes committed by persons under his authority", G Brand "War Crimes Trials and 
the Laws of War" (1949) 26 BYIL 414,424. 
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of Geneva Protocol I, but both Articles 86 and 87 were held to be in conformity with 
pre-existing law."44 
17. The establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
in 1992 was the first opportunity since the post-World War Two trials for an 
international tribunal to examine the doctrine of command responsibility. International 
law had developed since the Ni.irnberg and Tokyo trials, with the entry into force of 
the various Geneva Conventions and Protocols, and the development of international 
humanitarian law. The doctrine of command responsibility, as regards indirect 
responsibility,45 is articulated at Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute:46 
[t]he fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute was 
committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he 
knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had 
done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent 
such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof. 
In interpreting Article 7(3) the ICTY had to have regard to the international customary 
law existing at the time of the offences, to avoid compromising the nullum crimen 
sine lege principle.47 The Tribunal considers its interpretation of Article 7(3) to be 
consistent with the position in customary international law at the time the offences 
were committed,48 having regard to the WWII jurisprudence from the Ni.irnberg and 
Tokyo trials,49 the relevant articles from the First Protocol,50 the Rome Statute of the 
44 Bantekas, above n37, 576 - 577. 
45 Direct liability is captured under Article 7(1): "A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed 
or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in 
articles 2 to 5 of the present statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime." 
46 ICTY Statute, above nl4, Article 7(3); Note the ICTR has an identical provision, ICTR Statute, 
above n20, Article 6(3). 
47 "The implication of these explanations is that the Security Council, not being a legislative body, 
cannot create offences. It therefore vests in the Tribunal the exercise of jurisdiction in respect of 
offences already recognised in international humanitarian law. The Statute does not create substantive 
law, but provides a forum and framework for the enforcement of existing international humanitarian 
law" Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic (aka "Pavo''), Hazim Delic and Esad Landio (aka 
"Zenga") (" Celebici" Case) Judgement IT-96-21 (ICTY, 16 November 1998) para 417 [Celebici Case 
Trial Judgement] <http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/trialc2/judgement/index.htm> (last accessed 3 July 
2001); this principle is enshrined in the ICC Statute, above n2, Article 22. 
48 The ICTY has jurisdiction over offences committed within the territories of the Former Yugoslavia 
from l January 1991, ICTY Statute, above nl4, Article l. The ICTY's consideration of international 
law is grounded in this time period, and subsequent developments, such as the emergence of the ICC, 
may effect changes on the content of customary international law in the future. See below para 31. 
49 Some of the main cases are: Yamashita, above n41; United States v Karl Brandt et al Vo! IV Trials 
of War Criminals before the Ntirnberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No 10 (US Govt 
Printing Office: Washington 1950) (hereafter "TWC"); United States v Wilhelm List et al Vo! XI TWC; 
United States v Wilhelm Von Leeb et al Vol XI TWC; United States v Soemu Toyoda Official 
II 
ICCs 1 and the ILC Draft Code.s2 As a result its jurisprudence is of significance for 
other international tribunals or courts (the ICTR, and the ICC once it is established) 
and also for domestic courts dealing with offences under domestic jurisdiction.s3 
18. The ICTY considered the doctrine of command responsibility in a number of 
cases, in particular in the Celebici Case Judgements by Trial Chamber II and the 
Appeals Chamber.s4 In this case four men were charged with various crimes 
committed in the Celebici prison camp, located in central Bosnia. Of the four Zdravko 
Mucic and Zejnil Delalic were charged with criminal liability as superiors for failing 
to prevent or punish the crimes of their subordinates, pursuant to Article 7(3) of the 
ICTY Statute. Delalic was acquitted on this count, but Mucic was found guilty. This 
case was the first international judgement since World War II holding a superior liable 
for the crimes of his subordinates.ss After the ICTY formulated the doctrine in the 
Celebici case it has gone on to apply it in a number of other cases.s6 
Transcript of Record of Trial [Toyoda]; Trial of Friederich Flick et al Vo! VI TWC [Flick] ; 
Government Commissioner v Roechling 14 TWC [Roechling]. 
5° First Protocol , above n30, Articles 86 and 87 . 
51 ICC Statute, above n2, Article 28. 
52 ILC Draft Code, above n22, Article 6. 
53 The Prosecutor of the ICTY has allowed some cases within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to 
proceed in domestic courts, Sean D Murphy "Developments in International Criminal Law: Progress 
and Jurisprudence of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia" (1999) 93 AJIL 57, 64 -
65. On a more general note the development of jurisprudence in the area of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity by the International Tribunals will hopefully help domestic courts avoid the sort of 
mistaken jurisprudence exemplified by R v Finta [1994] l SCR 701. The Canadian Supreme Court read 
in to the actus reus and mens rea requirements for Canada's domestic war crimes legislation a number 
of extra elements not founded in International custom that will make prosecution in most cases 
virtually impossible: Irwin Cotter "Regina v Finta, Canadian Supreme Court War Crimes Decision" 90 
AJIL 461. 
54Celebici Case Trial Judgement, above n47, paras 330 - 400; Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, 'Zdravko 
Mucic (aka "Pavo " ), Hazim Delic and Esad Landio (aka "Zenga ") ( " Celebici " Case) Judgement IT-
96-21 (ICTY, 20 February 2001) paras 182 - 314 [Celebici Case Appeal Judgement] 
<http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/appeal/judgement/index.htm> (last accessed 3 July 2001); Vetter is of 
the opinion that " ... it is likely that the best evidence of customary international law for command 
responsibility is the Celebici case because of its thorough treatment of the doctrine" , Vetter, above n42, 
111 . The Celebici Case formulation of the doctrine of command responsibility has not gone un-
criticised. Ching is of the opinion that the Celebici formulation is not perfect as " .. . it has the potential 
danger of creating extensive liability for an especially poor or dull commander, Ann B. Ching 
"COMMENT: Evolution of the Command Responsibility Doctrine in Light of the Celebici Decision of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia" 25 NCJ Int'I Law & Com Reg 167, 
204. On the other hand Bantekas is of the opinion that the doctrine as elucidated in the Celebici case is 
too stringent in its requirements for prosecution, so that some offenders will potentially escape liability, 
Bantekas, above n37, 142 - 143. 
55Ching, above n54, 185. 
56 Prosecutor v Zlatko Aleksovski Judgement IT-95-14/1 (ICTY, 25 June 1999) [Aleksovski] 
<http://www.un.org/icty/aleksovski/trialc/judgement/index.htm> (last accessed 3 July 2001); The 
Prosecutor v Thomir Blaskic Judgement IT-95-14 (ICTY, 3 March 2000) [Blaskic] 
<http://www.un.org/icty/blaskic/trialcl/judgement/index.htm> (last accessed 12 August 2001); 
Prosecutor v Radislav Kristie Judgement IT-98-33 (ICTY, 2 August 2001) paras 647 - 651 [Kristie] 
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19. Command responsibility has two aspects: responsibility for positive acts (e.g. 
ordering, instigating, planning) and responsibility for culpable omissions, such as the 
failure to prevent or punish war crimes of subordinates. 57 The latter omission-based 
(or "indirect") responsibility is based on the existence of a legal duty to act to prevent 
or punish crimes of subordinates.58 The trial court broke down the elements in 
command responsibility for failure to act as follows: 59 
(a) the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship; 
(b) the superior knew or had reason to know that the criminal act was about to 
be or had been committed; and 
(c) the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to 
prevent the criminal act or punish the perpetrator thereof. 
20. The superior-subordinate relationship can be either de facto or de jure, and 
individuals can be criminally liable under the command responsibility doctrine when 
in non-military positions of superior authority. The relationship must be characterised 
by the superior having: 60 
.. . effective control over the persons committing the underlying violations of 
international humanitarian law, in the sense of having the material ability to prevent and 
punish the commission of these offences . . . such authority can have a de Jure or a de 
facto character. 
21. This element was considered on appeal by the Appeals Chamber, which upheld 
the Trial Chamber's analysis of customary Jaw, rejecting the prosecution's proposition 
that influence or powers of persuasion alone could found command responsibility. 61 
The Appeals Chamber held that the Trials Chamber had applied the correct test of 
"effective control. "62 It was also noted that the de facto control element of the test 
allows for command responsibility to arise where the superior-subordinate relationship 
<http://www.un.org/icty/krsticffrialCl/judgement/index.htm> (last accessed 15 August 2001). In the 
last case as the court made a finding of criminal liability for Kristie under Article 7(1) , direct command 
responsibility, it did not enter a conviction under Article 7(3) even though the tests were met for 
liability under that article, Kristie para 651. 
57 Celebici Case Trial Judgement, above n47, para 333 - 334. 
58 For example, First Protocol, above n30, Article 86 and 87; Bantekas, above n37, 592 - 594. 
59 Celebici Case Trial Judgement, above n47, para 346. 
6° Celebici Case Trial Judgement, above n47, para 378. 
61 Celebici Case Appeal Judgement, above n54, paras 248 - 268 . For a criticism of this finding see 
Bantekas, above n37, 581 - 582. 
62 Celebici Case Appeal Judgement, above n54, paras 266 - 267 . 
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1s indirect in character, as opposed to a direct relationship in a military chain of 
command, and that the control itself could be of an indirect character.63 
22. The mens rea element at paragraph 16(b) can be satisfied by either actual 
knowledge or by possession of information sufficient to put the superior on notice of 
the risk of such offences having occurred or occurring.64 The prosecutor must 
establish actual knowledge through direct or circumstantial evidence. There is no 
presumption of knowledge merely because offences may have been widespread, 
numerous, publicly notorious, committed over wide areas or prolonged periods.65 
However these factors may allow an inference to arise that he must have possessed 
that know ledge. 66 
23 . The second limb, "had reason to know" is consistent in meaning with the First 
Protocol Article 86(2) reference to " ... had information which should have enabled 
them to conclude ... " A commander therefore needs to be in possession of some 
information sufficient to put him on notice that crimes had been, or were going to be, 
committed.67 The types of information that can put a commander "on notice" vary, 
including oral and written reports, knowledge of levels of training and the character of 
his men; and for the information to be "in his possession" it is sufficient that it was 
available or provided to the superior, even if he did not acquaint himself with it.68 The 
Appeals Chamber rejected the prosecution's assertion that customary international law 
established a "duty to know" for military and civilian superiors.69 Such a duty would 
have the effect of making criminal liability under the doctrine of command 
responsibility a form of strict liability. As such it is necessary to establish particular 
information a superior had "in his possession" which was sufficient to put him on 
notice. 
63 Celebici Case Appeal Judgement, above n54, paras 251 - 252. 
64 Celebici Case Trial Judgement, above n47, para 383 . 
65 Bantekas argues that post World War II jurisprudence does establish a rebuttable presumption of 
actual knowledge where crimes were widespread and notorious, and that the ICTY's refusal to accept 
this presumption was "despite the weight of that precedent." Bantekas, above n37, 588 - 590. 
66 Celebici Case Trial Judgement, above n47, paras 228 - 230. 
67 Celebici Case Trial Judgement, above n47, para 387 - 393; Celebici Case Appeal Judgement, above 
n54, paras 231 - 236. 
68 Celebici Case Appeal Judgement, above n54, paras 238 - 239. 
69 Celebici Case Appeal Judgement, above n54, paras 248 - 268. 
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24. The third overall requirement 1s failure to take necessary and reasonable 
measures in accordance with their legal duty. 70 A superior can only reasonably be 
expected to take such measures as are within their power to take, expressed by the 
trial court as "such measures that are within his material possibility." It also notes that 
the "Jack of formal legal competence to take the necessary measures to prevent or 
repress the crime in question does not necessarily preclude the criminal responsibility 
of the superior".71 The court noted that it is impossible to Jay down strict guidelines on 
what might constitute necessary and reasonable measures outside of the context of the 
facts of a particular case.72 
25. Given that there is an "effective control" test to found a superior-subordinate 
relationship, the nature of that control on the facts of a given case will affect what 
might constitute necessary and reasonable measures. Under some circumstances 
reporting the matter to "the competent authorities" may be sufficient to discharge this 
obligation.73 The factual framework of the superior-subordinate relationship, both de 
facto and de Jure, the degree of control asserted, and the measures reasonably open to 
a superior in a given situation, to name just a few possible factors, will determine in a 
given fact situation what would have constituted necessary and reasonable measures. 
IV CIVILIAN SUPERIORS AND COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY 
26. Of particular concern in the scenario under consideration here is the 
applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility to civilian superiors. Several 
civilian superiors were tried following the Second World War.74 The ICTY's 
elucidation of customary international law includes the possibility of civilian superiors 
being found criminally liable under the doctrine of command responsibility.75 In 1998 
the Prime Minister of Rwanda, Jean Kambanda pleaded guilty to various crimes 
before the ICTR, including counts under the ICTR's command responsibility 
70 "It has also been suggested that the concept of reasonableness is difficult to apply in this context 
since it requires a balancing of social costs and benefits when there are no accepted norms regarding 
the relative value of such things as war crimes prevention and military success." Mitchell, above n37, 
409. 
7 1 Celebici Case Trial Judgement, above n47, para 395. 
72 Celebici Case Trial Judgement, above n47, paras 394 - 395. 
73 Blaskic, above n56, para 336. 
74 For example Flick, above n49; Roechling, above n49; Toyoda, above n49. 
75 Celebici Case Trial Judgement, above n47, para 355 - 363. The Trial Chamber considered the trial of 
some civilian leaders under the doctrine by the Tokyo Tribunal, as well as the Flick case, above n49, 
and the Roechling, above n49, case from Germany. 
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provision.76 This was the first conviction of a Head of State by an international 
tribunal. The Indictments of Radovan Karadzic77 and Slobodan Milosevic,78 the 
former Bosnian Serb Head of State for the Bosnian Serb Republic and the former 
Head of State of the FRY, include criminal liability on this basis. 
27. The elements required for a civilian leader under the doctrine of command 
responsibility are the same three discussed above for military commanders, with the 
exception of the definition of the superior-subordinate relationship. The ICTY's 
Aleksovski judgement79 considered that a civilian's position as a superior needed to be 
analogous to a military commanders, but that the civilian's "sanctioning power must 
be interpreted broadly." A civilian in most cases will not have the same extent of de 
Jure powers a military commander has, for instance to arrest and charge an offender 
through the military discipline system. A civilian superior's ability de Jure or de facto 
to impose sanctions is not essential to liability; the possibility of transmitting reports 
to the appropriate authorities may be enough to found liability. 80 These qualifications 
may mitigate the restrictiveness of the Celebici case conclusion that " ... the doctrine of 
superior responsibility extends to civilian superiors only to the extent that they 
exercise a degree of control over their subordinates which is similar to that of military 
commanders. "81 
28. This broader interpretation of the sanctioning power of a civilian superior, in 
order to satisfy the "effective control" test, impacts on the third requirement for failure 
to take necessary and reasonable measures. As noted above the interpretation of what 
necessary and reasonable measures are in a given case has to be determined within the 
context of the facts of the case. It follows from the effective control test, and the 
requirement to take measures within the superior's "material responsibility", that the 
nature of the control will be determinative of what constitutes necessary and 
reasonable measures. The civilian superior's lack of the coercive de Jure authority 
76 Prosecutor v Jean Kambanda ICTR-97-23-S (ICTR September 4, 1998) 
<http://www.un.org/ictr/english/judgements/kambanda.html> (last accessed 15 August 2001). 
Kambanda plead guilty to counts under Article 6(3) of the ICTR Statute, above n20. 
77 Indictment Prosecutor v Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic (ICTY, July 1995) 
<http://www.un.org1icty/indictment/english/kar-ii950724e.htm> (last accessed 12 July 2001) 
78 Amended Indictment Prosecutor v Slobodan Milosevic, Milan Milutinovic, Nikola Sainovic, 
Dragoljub, Vlajko Stojilkovic IT-99-37-I (ICTY, 29 June 2001) 
<http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mil-ai0l0629e.htm> (last accessed 12 July 2001). 
79 Aleksovski, above n56. 
80 Aleksovski, above n56, para 78. 
81 Celebici Case Trial Judgement, above n47, para 378. 
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vested in military commanders will necessarily dictate a different set of requirements 
to be discharged to meet their duty to take necessary and reasonable measures to 
prevent or punish. 
29. The ICC Statute's provision for non-military command responsibility departs 
from the ICTY formulation. The ICC Statute structures its provisions on the doctrine 
of command responsibility in two parts, Article 28(a) covering a military commander 
or person effectively acting as a military commander, and Article 28(b) covering any 
other superior-subordinate relationship. The mens rea requirement for non-military 
indirect command responsibility in Article 28(b) is narrower than that determined in 
the Celebici Case, requiring "the superior either knew, or consciously disregarded 
information which clearly indicated that the subordinates were committing or about to 
commit such crimes"82 [emphasis added]. 
30. In addition to the Celebici Case elements, the ICC Statute requires that in the 
case of non-military superiors the crimes concerned are activities within the effective 
authority and control of the superior. 83 The meaning of this extra element is unclear. 84 
Vetter notes that " .. .it is difficult to assess whether the ICC civilian standard is a 
departure from prior customary international law for civilian command responsibility 
for two reasons: (1) The holdings of the handful of civilian cases tried after World War 
II are subject to various interpretations, and (2) the source of a civilian superior's duty 
may be difficult to determine and may be less onerous than a military commander's 
duty."85 
31. The ICC formulation of the doctrine of command responsibility with respect to 
non-military superiors is arguably not international custom yet. The Celebici Case is 
currently the most authoritative statement of the content of international custom,86 
while only 36 States have ratified the ICC Statute. 87 If all the 139 signatories ratify the 
82 ICC Statute, above n2, Article 28(b)(i), Contrasted with "Knew or had reason to know" in the ICTY 
Statute, above nl4, Article 7(3). 
83 ICC Statute, above n2, Article 28(b)(ii) . 
84 Vetter, above n42, 119 - 120. 
85 Vetter, above n42, 110. 
86 Vetter, above n42, 111. 
87 Above, n2. 
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ICC Statute then this may lead to some change in the customary position, though with 
some uncertainty as regards some of the persistent objectors. 88 
32. It is also necessary to note the ICTR case of The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul 
Akayesu. 89 In conflict with the findings of the ICTY in the Celebici Case, and other 
subsequent cases, the ICTR declined to assert that the doctrine of command 
responsibility applies to civilians as a general rule. Its ruling considerably narrowed 
the scope of the doctrine as it applies to civilians. A comparison of the judgements 
and their reasoning favours the Celebici Case as a better analysis and summary of the 
customary international law position. 90 
33. The current international customary law doctrine of command responsibility, as 
regards civilian superiors, seems therefore to consist of: 
(a) The existence of a superior-subordinate relationship characterised by the 
superior having effective control over the subordinate.91 The control has to 
be analogous to that of military commander, but the civilian superior's 
sanctioning powers must be interpreted broadly.92 
(b) The superior knew or had reason to know that the criminal act was about 
to be or had been committed. This is either actual knowledge, which can 
be inferred from the circumstances and evidence,93 or the commander 
must have been in possession of some information sufficient to put them 
on notice.94 
88 For the persistent objector rule see Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case ( 1951) ICJ Rep 116. In this 
instance there were a small number of States that participated at the Rome Conference who did not sign 
the ICC Statute, the most significant was the United States. 
89 The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu Judgement ICTR-96-4-T (ICTR, 4 September 1998) 
<http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Akayesu/judgement/akayOOl.htm> (last accessed 12 August 
2001). 
90 "Reading the opinions side by side, on the civilian command responsibility issue the Celebici Case 
seems better reasoned because it draws on a more balanced set of sources to evidence international 
customary law; whereas the ICTR court reasons from on judge's dissent in a post-World War II case." 
Vetter, above n42, 132 - 134. 
91 Celebici Case Trial Judgement, above n47, para 378. 
92 Aleksovski, above n56, para 78. 
93 Celebici Case Trial Judgement, above n4 7, paras 228 - 230. 
94 Celebici Case Trial Judgement, above n47, para 387 - 393; Celebici Case Appeal Judgement, above 
n54, paras 231 - 236. 
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(c) The superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to 
prevent the criminal act or punish the perpetrator thereof. Such measures 
must be within the material possibility for the superior.95 
34. With these qualifications in mind, are the three necessary elements made out for 
Clinton and Blair, with respect to the three incidents this paper is assuming are prima 
facie war crimes? 
V THE DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY AND 
BLAIR/CLINTON 
A The Existence of a Superior - Subordinate Relationship 
35. Both Clinton and Blair were clearly in a position of direct superior authority vis-
a-vis their own forces in the NATO coalition. Over their own forces both men, as 
Head of State and Head of Government respectively, had sufficient authority both de 
jure and de facto to order measures to prevent offences or punish offenders. Clinton, 
as President of the United States, is constitutionally the Commander in Chief of the 
United States Armed Forces. Blair, as Prime Minister, is in a position of constitutional 
responsibility for the activities of the Executive Branch of Government. Both men 
would also meet the additional requirement from the ICC Statute for the activities 
concerned to be within their effective control, if that requirement was part of 
customary law. 
B Direct Liability 
36. Clinton and Blair could be held criminally liable if they ordered, instigated or 
planned any of the attacks that constituted a war crime. The only incident for which 
they could be fixed with this direct liability is the attack on RTS. The other two 
incidents related to the manner of attack, decided by the pilot working within their 
rules of engagement after the target had been selected. This direct liability would 
accrue if RTS were a civilian rather than a military object, turning the attack into a 
direct attack on the civilian population causing death in violation of Article 85(3)(a) 
of the First Protocol. The OTP concluded, on the evidence, that "insofar as the attack 
actually was aimed at disrupting the communications network, it was legally 
95 Celebici Case Trial Judgement, above n47, para 395 . 
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acceptable."96 The qualification in the finding was because NATO justified the attack 
on two grounds: that RTS was a command, control and communications centre;97 and 
on the grounds that it was used for a propaganda purpose.98 If NATO had based the 
attack purely on the latter ground the attack would have probably been illegal.99 
37. The other criticisms of the attack, on the basis that it was a military target, 
revolve around allegations that it violated other principles of the laws and customs of 
war requiring proportionality' 00 and adequate warning. 101 Clinton and Blair's direct 
involvement would most likely have been at the highest strategic level, the decision to 
attack. The timing and means of attack were operational and tactical decisions taken 
by their subordinates. Liability for violating these principles, arguably thereby causing 
the attack to become "indiscriminate", would be for indirect command responsibility. 
C Indirect Liability 
38. For each of the incidents both men could potentially be held liable through the 
doctrine of command responsibility if they failed to prevent or punish war crimes. As 
discussed above, once the superior-subordinate relationship has been established 
liability for the crimes of subordinates will be founded if it is established that: 
(a) The superior knew or had reason to know that an offence was about to be 
committed, or had been committed; and 
(b) The superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to 
prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof. 
1 Mens rea - knew or had reason to know 
39. There is little difficulty in satisfying the mens rea requirement for both Clinton 
and Blair. The international media broadcast the facts of each of the attacks globally, 
while the campaign was still underway. 102 NATO press briefings revealed the relevant 
96 OTP Final Report, above nl 1, para 75. 
97 OTP Final Report, above nl 1, paras 72 - 73. 
98 OTP Final Report, above nl 1, para 74. 
99 The OTP are less direct, finding that" ... its legality might well be questioned by some experts in the 
field of humanitarian law" OTP Final Report, above nl 1, para 76. 
100 OTP Final Report, above nl 1, paras 48 - 52; First Protocol, above n30, Article 57(2)(a)(iii). 
101 First Protocol, above n30, Article 57(2)(c). 
102 For example the attack on the refugee convoys at Djakovica: BBC News Online "NATO: We may 
have Killed Refugees" (19 April 1999) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_323000/323248.stm> (last accessed 21 August 
2001). 
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facts of each of the incidents, in a matter of days. 103 Given the sensitivity of any 
civilian casualties, and the potential to undermine support for NATO's actions, it is 
also likely that Clinton and Blair were receiving detailed briefings from their Defence 
Staff and NATO. 
40. From the scrutiny and exposure by the international media, as well as statements 
made by Clinton and Blair, it would be possible to infer actual knowledge of the 
circumstances of the attacks giving rise to questions of their legality. Even if there 
were insufficient evidence to infer actual knowledge, the "had reason to know" test 
would be met. Both Clinton and Blair would have been in possession of sufficient 
information to put them on notice that war crimes may have been committed. 104 
41. The discussion so far has focused on a failure to punish after the alleged offence 
was committed. If either man knew that such offences were likely to occur then they 
would be liable for failure to prevent them. Each of the alleged offences arises from 
tactical decisions of the pilots in the developing situation of the attack, or in the case 
of RTS an operational decision by NATO Command on the time and manner of 
attack. It would be difficult to argue Clinton and Blair could have foreseen the 
situations and acted to prevent. The only basis would be that the requirement to 
operate above 15,000 feet made lawful application of the laws of war "virtually 
impossible", and therefore there was a requirement to take action to prevent, by 
reducing this limit. 105 However the evidence does not bear out this claim, as the 
statistics above at paragraph 12 show. If operating above 15,000 feet made operating 
lawfully "virtually impossible" then one would expect more than 0.9% of so1ties 
leading to civilian deaths. It seems therefore that there is an insufficient basis to allege 
a failure to prevent. 
2 Failure to Take Necessary and Reasonable Measures 
42. The last element required for omission-based command responsibility is the 
failure to take necessary and reasonable measures to either prevent the commission of 
103 For the Grdelica attack, Press Conference NATO HQ Brussels (13 April 1999) 
<http;//www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p9904l3a.htm> (last accessed 21 August 2001); for the Djakovica 
attack, Press Conference NATO HQ Brussels (15 April 1999) 
<http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p9904l5a.htm> (accessed 21 August 2001); for the attack on RTS, 
Press Conference NATO HQ Brussels (23 April 1999) 
<http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p9904231.htm> (accessed 21 August 2001). 
104 Celebici Case Trial Judgement, above n47 , paras 387 - 393. 
105 Amnesty Report, above n9, section 4. 
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crimes, or to punish the offenders if they are committed. The discussion so far has 
concluded that both Clinton and Blair are superiors, both de jure and de facto, and that 
they knew or had reason to know that these three attacks may have constituted war 
crimes. Proceeding on the assumption that they are in fact prima facie war crimes, if 
the two leaders failed to take reasonable and necessary measures to punish the 
perpetrators they will be personally liable for the crimes. 
43. NATO claimed to have initiated investigations into some of the incidents that 
are alleged to have comprised war crimes. However, the only incident that has given 
rise to any form of disciplinary proceedings is the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in 
Belgrade. The United States admitted responsibility, paid compensation to the 
families and the Chinese Government, a number of CIA officers were reprimanded 
and one was dismissed. No criminal proceedings have been undertaken. 106 
44. The main difficulty in this area is the lack of evidence of what, if any, measures 
NATO took following these incidents. Were internal investigations undertaken? Was 
the fact that such investigations were undertaken, and the results of those 
investigations, made known to Clinton and Blair? All of the participating NATO 
countries have Legal Departments in their armed forces and these may have carried 
out investigations of the lawfulness of questionable incidents. Most military 
organisations would can·y out an investigation as a matter of course after an attack had 
gone wrong, but the internal military investigation is generally focused on the military 
effectiveness of operations. The investigation is to ensure future mistakes are avoided, 
to optimise operational effectiveness, rather than an inquiry into the legality of the 
incident. Of course where an incident is plainly criminal then a criminal investigation 
will be undertaken. 
45. Are internal investigations by NATO, or by one of the member States, sufficient 
to satisfy the "necessary and reasonable measures" requirement imposed by the 
doctrine of command responsibility? Without access to the investigation terms of 
reference and findings there is no way to know if these investigations were conducted 
in a manner that would render them such. The debate over the lawfulness of these 
incidents illustrates that they are not clear violations of the laws and customs of war. It 
could well be open for a properly conducted investigation to find that no violation 
106 OTP Final Report, above n 11, para 84. 
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occurred. However, it would be for the court or tribunal to assess whether the 
investigation and its findings were reasonable, and whether it was reasonable for the 
superior to rely on the findings. Otherwise superiors could escape criminal liability by 
relying on sham investigations, and turning their mind from considering the merits of 
the investigation. 
D Liability for Omission to Act and the RTS Strike: Command 
Responsibility and Multinational Coalitions, a Diffusion of Responsibility? 
46. Operation Allied Force was an example of a multinational coalition force in 
action. Western armies accept that the formation of coalitions will be the normal way 
of reacting to and meeting threats in the future. 107 This has been seen in recent 
military operations under the UN aegis, 108 and regionally based operations. 109 The 
command and control of multinational coalitions is a complex web of military and 
political constraints, and the force commander will in many cases not have full and 
unrestricted command of all the various national elements in the coalition. Individual 
national contingents will often relay orders back to their nations for military and 
political decision-makers to consider whether they are compatible with national 
objectives and restrictions. 
47. What are the implications of coalition operations for the doctrine of command 
responsibility? Amnesty International claims that: 
Operation Allied Force was fought by a coalition of NATO member states in the name 
of the alliance as a whole ... at no point during the air campaign did any alliance 
member publicly repudiate any of the attacks carried out by NATO forces. Therefore 
each NATO member may incur responsibility for the military actions carried out under 
the NATO aegis. 110 
48. This proposition has two aspects, State responsibility for each and every war 
crime committed by NATO, and individual criminal responsibility through the 
doctrine of command responsibility. The first aspect is not within the scope of this 
discussion. In terms of individual criminal responsibility is this Amnesty International 
107 For example Major General Robert H Scales writes: "For the foreseeable future the United States 
will remain reluctant to intervene unilaterally in most crises: as a consequence, the need for coalition 
partners will shape American strategy." Robert H Scales "Future Warfare Anthology" (US Army War 
College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, April 1999). , 
108 The Gulf War 1990, Somalia (UNOSOM), Bosnia (UNPROFOR), East Timor (UNTAET). 
109 The intervention by ECOMOG in Sierra Leone and Liberia, NATO actions in Bosnia (IFOR then 
SFOR) and Kosovo (Operation Just Cause and then KFOR). 
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proposition supportable? As noted above the idea that command responsibility is a 
strict liability offence must be rejected. 111 So there cannot be individual liability 
predicated merely on the fact a military or civilian superior is a member of NATO, 
and failed to repudiate attacks that were of questionable legality. Any liability would 
have to be predicated on satisfaction of the legal tests discussed above for the doctrine 
of command responsibility. What the Amnesty proposition does highlight is the 
potential difficulties that complex multi-national coalitions with complex, and blurred, 
command and control relationships pose to the doctrine of command responsibility. 
49. The strike on RTS provides an example of this. Amnesty alleges that there was 
disagreement among the NATO partners as to the legality of the strike on RTS. As a 
result one nation, reportedly the United States, went ahead with the attack despite the 
objections of the other NATO partners. 11 2 If that strike did, in the event, constitute a 
war crime could criminal liability be attributed to the superiors of the other, objecting, 
NATO partners? 
50. The difficulty for analysis is in determining whether the military and relevant 
political superiors had the necessary control over the United States to prevent the 
bombing. Given that the relationship is a complex, and to some extent indeterminate 
mix, of military and political influence a court might have some difficulty in 
determining if there was the requisite control. Also the degree of control will vary 
with each nation; so Spain's influence with the United States may be less than the 
United Kingdom's. The national element that conducted the strike may have done so 
without the command approval of NATO command. What then is the position of the 
various commanders' in the NATO hierarchy? It is important to note that the test of 
effective control, and the fact that such control can be indirect and de facto , means 
that more than one superior may be held responsible for a crime committed by a 
subordinate.113 So where the relevant tests set out for the doctrine of command 
responsibility are met liability could extend across a coalition, and not just directly up 
the chain of command. 
51. What constitute necessary and reasonable measures in the context of a complex 
coalition? Assume that NATO's humanitarian intervention was lawful. What 
110 Amnesty Report, above n9, section 2.4. 
111 Above, para 23. 
11 2 Amnesty Report, above n9, section 5.3, citing press reports . 
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constitutes necessary and reasonable measures given the political necessity to hold 
together a complex multinational coalition to achieve a lawful objective? This is a 
difficult question. It is not within the scope of this paper to address these complex 
issues. Suffice to say that they are real and important issues, given the shift that most 
developed nations are making to the concept of the multinational coalition as the 
standard force structure to confront the security challenges of the 21 st Century. 
52. These difficulties do present a major challenge for any prosecution of Clinton 
and Blair. The identity of the aircraft and pilots involved in the incidents is not 
certain. If they were U.S. aircraft does Blair escape the possibility of liability? 
Conversely, if the aircraft were from the U.K. does Clinton escape liability? Or do 
both men escape liability because their national forces were detached from national 
command and operating under NATO leadership? Problems of proof were identified 
as one of the factors in the OTP decision that no further investigation was 
warranted. 114 The only incident where this may not impede prosecution is direct 
command responsibility for ordering the attack on RTS, if it was a civilian object and 
not a military target, as liability is incurred for giving the orders and the identity of the 
attacking aircraft is irrelevant. 
E Conclusions on Clinton and Blair's Liability 
53. Assuming that the three incidents were primafacie war crimes both Clinton and 
Blair clearly satisfy the first two requirements for indirect command responsibility, 
the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship and actual or constructive 
knowledge. The difficulty arises with the third requirement, the failure to take 
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or punish. In this instance it would be 
the failure to punish that would be needed to found liability. Because the lawfulness 
of the incidents are not clear cut both men would be able to rely on internal 
investigations, if their findings of fact and conclusions were reasonable, to show that 
necessary and reasonable measures had been taken. 
54. The direct liability for ordering the attack on RTS would require proof that they 
did in fact order the strike, and that RTS could not be classified as a military target. 
On the evidence it seems that RTS was able to be classified as a military target, and 
113 Blaskic, above n56, para 303; 
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unless they were involved in the operational and tactical planning of the strike, they 
cannot be fixed with liability via the direct responsibility limb of command 
responsibility. 
55. However, given the assumption that the three incidents are prima facie war 
crimes, and the fact that the pilots involved have not been punished, the burden must 
be on Clinton and Blair to lead some evidence that necessary and reasonable measures 
were taken. Then the burden will shift back to those alleging criminal responsibility to 
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the measures taken do not satisfy their legal duty. 
VI SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES 
AGAINST HUMANITY 
56. Assuming that criminal liability could be founded through the doctrine of 
command responsibility, what protection do Clinton and Blair receive from their 
positions as a current former Head of State and Head of Government a under 
international law? Traditional Head of State Immunity, as a norm of customary 
international law, was an aspect of Sovereign Immunity. This is a principle that acts to 
prevent the courts of one State sitting in judgement on the acts of another State. 115 
This principle has its roots in the equality of States at the international level. 116 The 
extension of sovereign immunity to the Head of State was based in the idea of the 
Head of State, the sovereign, as the personification of the state. In their domestic law 
States base Head of State immunity on such grounds as sovereign immunity, 
diplomatic immunity and the Act of State doctrine. 117 
57. The initial restrictions on the doctrine of Head of State Immunity came within 
the field of ci vii law, drawing a distinction between private acts and official acts, 
particularly in the case of commercial transactions, 118 though the recognition of these 
exceptions is not universal. 119 The immunity of Heads of State belongs to the State, 
and not the person, so that the State may waive its immunity for a Head of State or 
114 "In all cases, either the law is not sufficiently clear or investigations are unlikely to result in the 
acquisition of sufficient evidence to substantiate charges against high level accused or against lower 
accused for particularly heinous offences." OTP Final Report, above nl 1, para 90. 
115 Gilbert Sison "Recent Development: a King no More: the Impact of the Pinochet Decision on the 
Doctrine of Head of State Immunity" (2000) 78 Wash ULQ 1583, 1584-1587. 
116 This principle is reflected in the UN Charter at Art 2(1). 
117 Sison, above nl 15, 1584 - 1585. 
118 Governor of Pitcairn and Associated Islands v Sutton [ 1995] l NZLR 426, 428 per Cooke P (CA). 
119 For example Russia adheres to a view of absolute immunity, Sison, above nl 15, 1587. 
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diplomat. 120 The analysis of sovereign immunity in the Pinochet121 decision drew a 
distinction between the immunity enjoyed by a sitting Head of State and that enjoyed 
by a former Head of State. A current Head of State's immunity attaches to their 
person (ratione personae) and is an absolute procedural immunity, while a former 
Head of State's immunity attaches only to official acts performed in their official 
· ( . · ) 122 capacity ratwne matenae . 
58. However, since WWII, with respect to serious international crimes, international 
custom has restricted the application of this doctrine. 123 The Ntirnberg Tribunal in 
Article 7 of its charter excluded any immunity based on official status, including that 
of Head of State or Head of Government. 124 This provision was included in the Tokyo 
Charter at Article 6, the ICTY Statute at Article 7(2), 125 the ICTR Statute at Article 
6, 126 the ICC Statute at Article 27, 127 and was recognised by the ILC in the Ntirnberg 
principles at Principle III, 128 and the ILC Draft Code at Article 7. 129 This principle of 
individual criminal responsibility denies substantive immunity to international 
criminals, though their sovereign immunity may still provide procedural immunity 
before domestic courts and even international tribunals. 130 The effect of the Pinochet 
decision 131 is to deny that international crimes can be "official acts" carried out in the 
public capacity of the individual, and therefore protected by immunity ratione 
materiae. 132 
59. How far do these various instruments reflect the state of international customary 
law? The ICTY considers its Statute to be reflective of customary international law, 
120 Ruth Wedgwood "40th Anniversary Perspective: International Criminal Law and Augusto Pinochet" 
(Spring, 2000) 40 Va J Int'I L 829, 838. 
121 Above n22. 
122 Sison, above nl 15, 1588. 
123 Though the possibility of its individual criminal liability overcoming sovereign immunity was 
mooted after the First World War, see the Commission of Responsibility Report, above n38. 
124 Ni.irnberg Charter, above n40, Article 7. 
125 ICTY Statute, above n14, Article 7(2). 
126 ICTR Statute, above n20, Article 6. 
127 ICC Statute, above n2, Article 27. 
128 Principles of International Law Recognised in the Charter of the Ni.irnberg Tribunal and in the 
Judgement of the Tribunal, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1950, Vol III. 
<http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/nurnfra.htm> (last accessed 4 July 2001) 
129ILC Draft Code, above n22. 
130 "Princeton Principles" on Universal Jurisdiction (2001, Princeton University) [Princeton Principles] 
<http://www.princeton.edu/- lapa/univejur.pdf> (last accessed 29 August 2001). 
131 Above n22. 
132 Andrea Bianchi "Immunity versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case" EJIL On-line Section 2D 
<http://www.ejil.org/journal/VollO/No2/artl-02.html#TopOfPage> (last accessed 19 August 2001). 
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and it is interpreted to be consistent with custom as at the time of the offences. 133 The 
quality of the jurisprudence of the Tribunal lends some support to its claims. The ILC 
also considers that this principle of individual accountability even for Heads of State 
or Government is reflective of custom, as developed after World War II and reflected 
in the various international instruments cited above. 134 
60. State practice in many cases may seem to belie this principle. Many States 
harbour former Heads of State from justice: Idi Amin harboured in Saudi Arabia, 
Mengistu Haile Mariam in Zimbabwe, Jean Claude (Baby Doc) Duvalier in France, to 
name a few. 135 However the fact that some states deviate from an otherwise accepted 
norm does not prevent that norm hardening into a rule of customary international 
law. 136 The State practice evidenced by the Tribunals following the Second World 
War, the attitude of States to the formation of the ICTY and ICTR under Chapter VII 
of the Charter, 137 and the wide consensus on the Statute of the ICC, 138 all constitute 
evidence of opinio juris and state practice. 
61. The Pinochet decision also seems to have stimulated efforts elsewhere in the 
world to bring former Heads of State to account. Chile proceeded with prosecution of 
Pinochet after his return from the United Kingdom, though this prosecution has been 
discontinued due to Pinochet's poor health. 139 The former dictator of Chad, Hissene 
Habn~, was arrested in Senegal and indicted on torture charges. Senegal's supreme 
133 Above para 17. 
134 ILC Report 1996, above n23, commentary on Article 7. 
135 Mary Margaret Penrose "It's Good to be the King! : Prosecuting Heads of State and Former Heads of 
State Under International Law" 39 Colum J Transnat'I L 193, 196. 
136 State practice must be consistent, not rigidly uniform, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
against Nicaragua (Merits) (1986) ICJ Reports 14, 99 - 100 [Nicaragua Case]. 
137 The Security Resolution itself is not evidence of state practice, but the attitudes of States to the 
resolution, and to the formation and conduct of the Tribunals is. Significantly for the ICTY the States 
most concerned with the institution have recently cooperated with the ICTY in extraditing some of 
their indicted nationals. For Croatia see BBC News Online "Croatia's War Crimes Legacy" (16 July 
2001) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_l 44 l OOO/ 1441771.strn> (last accessed 
12 August 2001); for Serbia see BBC News Online "Serbs hand over war crimes suspect" (23 March 
2001) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_l238000/l238793.stm> (last accessed 
12 August 2001), and also the transfer of Milosevic to the ICTY, CNN "Lawyer says Milosevic to 
accept help" (4 July 2001) 
<http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/07/03/milosevic.court/index.html> (last accessed 12 
August 2001); for Bosnia see BBC News Online "More Bosnia Arrests Urged" (3 August 2001) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_l47 l000/1471954.strn> (last accessed 12 
August 2001). 
138 139 signatories and 36 ratifications to the ICC Statute, above n2 , as at 4 July 2001. To put this in 
perspective there are currently 189 member States of the United Nations. 
139 "Chilean Court Rules Pinochet Unfit to Stand Trial" (9 July 2001) 
<http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/americas/07/09/pinochet/index.html> (last accessed 9 August 
2001). 
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court was not prepared to assert jurisdiction as Senegal had not enacted legislation to 
implement the torture convention, but the UN Committee against torture has called on 
Senegal to hold Habre for extradition by a state that is prepared to exercise 
jurisdiction. 140 On 4 July 2001 the former president of FRY, Milosevic, appeared at 
the ICTY for trial. 141 As noted above the Prime Minister of Rwanda has already been 
convicted by the ICTR. 142 
62. This conflict between the principle of individual criminal responsibility for 
international crimes, regardless of any official capacity, and the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity is still not fully resolved. The position at customary law seems to be that the 
principle of individual criminal responsibility will fix criminal liability upon those 
protected by sovereign immunity. Their immunity becomes a procedural immunity, 
rather than a substantive immunity, for such time as that immunity persists. Those 
persons enjoying immunity ratione personae founded on an official position, such as 
a diplomat or Head of State, enjoy an absolute procedural immunity as long as they 
hold that official position. 143 Once they leave office their protection is reduced to 
ratione materiae, immunity only for official acts. 144 At that time they are vulnerable 
to prosecution on the lines of the Pinochet case. This position may be shifting, as the 
conviction of the Prime Minister of Rwanda and indictment of Milosevic while he 
was still Head of State illustrate. 145 A duly constituted international tribunal, through 
Chapter VII of the United Nations or by treaty, might be able to defeat even immunity 
ratione personae, but this has not been tested. 
63. The real difficulty in this issue is in determining the scope of the principle of 
individual criminal responsibility as it relates to the jurisdiction of domestic courts, as 
140 Human Rights Watch Press Release, April 23 2001 
<http://www.hrw.org/press/200l/habrecat0423.htm> (last accessed 27 June 2001). Under the Torture 
Convention 1984 Senegal has an obligation aut dedere aut judicare (to extradite or prosecute), Torture 
Convention 1984, above n4, Articles 5(2), 6(1), 7(1) and 8. Senegal cannot plead deficiencies of its 
domestic law to avoid international obligations under the Convention, Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties 1969 Article 27 <http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treatfra.htm> (last accessed 4 July 2001). 
141 CNN "Lawyer says Milosevic to accept help" above n135; Ruth Wedgewood "Former Yugoslav 
President Slobodan Milosevic To Be Tried in The Hague for Crimes Against Humanity and War 
Crimes Allegedly Committed in Kosovo" ASIL Insights July 2001 
<http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh76.htm> (last accessed 20 July 2001). 
142 Above para 26. 
143 Princeton Principles, above nl30, 48 - 51. 
144 The Pinochet decision, above n22, formulated sovereign immunity for ex-Heads of State in this 
manner, though it must be noted they were construing s20 of the UK's State Immunity Act. The House 
of Lords construed s20 in light of international law so the decision is still of use in examining the state 
oflnternational Law, Bianchi, above nl32, section 2D. 
145 Princeton Principles, above nl30, 51. 
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opposed to international tribunals. International tribunals are reliant on States to arrest 
offenders and transfer them to the tribunal, so if offenders have immunity in domestic 
proceedings this may effectively deny an international tribunal any possibiJity of 
exercising its jurisdiction. The commentary on the ILC Draft Code refers to the scope 
of this principle as referring to "appropriate proceedings": 146 
... the author of a crime under international law cannot invoke his official position to 
escape punishment in appropriate proceedings. The absence of any procedural 
immunity with respect to prosecution or punishment in appropriate judicial 
proceedings is an essential corollary of the absence of any substantive immunity or 
defence. [emphasis added] 
64. For immunity ratione materiae this is not necessarily a difficulty, as the 
Pinochet decision illustrates. Protection in this instance only attaches to official acts 
and the customary international law is sufficiently developed for war crimes to found 
a basis for universal jurisdiction and for the principle of individual responsibility to 
override the official status of the acts in question. 147 War crimes are therefore 
incapable of characterisation as "official acts", using the Pinochet approach, and 
immunity ratione materiae cannot attach to those acts. 
65. The difficulty arises in the context of immunity ratione personae. Here the 
international custom seems to deny that the principle of individual criminal 
responsibility can trump immunity ratione personae in a domestic court. This is an 
important issue for International Tribunals as the arrest of an offender by a State, and 
their transfer to the tribunal, will be barred by immunity ratione personae. The ICTY, 
for one, seems to have considered that they had jurisdiction to prosecute a sitting 
Head of State, as their indictment of Milosevic showed. Whether this is due to the 
status of customary international law or due to the tribunal's status under Chapter VII 
of the Charter is less clear, though some of these issues may be clarified with respect 
to a former Head of State during the upcoming trial. The point here is that while the 
ICTY asserted jurisdiction over Milosevic they are reliant on a State to arrest and 
transfer him into ICTY custody to exercise that jurisdiction. Milosevic's ratione 
personae would have acted as an absolute obstacle to the necessary proceedings by a 
State to arrest and transfer him to the ICTY, rendering any jurisdiction the ICTY 
might have redundant. 
146 ILC Report 1996, above n23, commentary on Article 7, para 6. 
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66. At the level of international law there is certainly an argument that the domestic 
courts of a State might be considered "appropriate judicial proceedings," in the 
context of certain international crimes. The prohibitions against conduct amounting to 
war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity and torture have the character of 
peremptory norms of international law, rules of jus cogens. In the Pinochet case it was 
noted that breaches of jus cogens rules may be punished by any State because the 
offenders are the common enemies of all mankind, and therefore all States have an 
equal interest in their prosecution. 148 States are not natural persons that can act for 
themselves, they act through organs and agents. This is the principle underlying the 
attribution of individual criminal responsibility for serious international crimes, and is 
of significance for State action in response to a breach of ajus cogens rule. 
67. If a State is entitled to act to punish the perpetrator of an act breaching a jus 
cogens rule, on the basis that the perpetrator is an enemy of all mankind; and it is 
recognised that for the act in question official capacity is no defence and no bar to 
proceedings at an international level, what basis is there to object to that State taking 
appropriate action through one of its organs? Just as the executive could take 
diplomatic action against another State in the case of State responsibility for an 
international wrong, the courts take action against the individual in the case of 
individual responsibility for an international crime. In the former instance this is the 
State acting at an international level through one of its organs, in the latter it is 
arguable that this is also the State acting at the international level through an organ -
its courts. The crime is international in basis, the jurisdiction is founded in 
international law, the derogation from the doctrine of sovereign immunity is founded 
in international custom, and the State is entitled under international custom to 
prosecute. The domestic courts of a State, as an organ of that State, are the most 
appropriate organ to deal with the breach of a jus cogens rule that has given rise to 
individual criminal responsibility, as is that State's right under customary 
international law. Where there is an international tribunal or court that can exercise 
jurisdiction, it may well be more appropriate to hand the offender over for prosecution 
147 Above, paras 58 - 59. Bianchi , above nl32, section 4. 
148 Pinochet, above n22, paras 40 - 41 per Lord Brown-Wilkinson. 
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in an international court. But where that is not possible it must be possible for a State 
to take appropriate action in response to a violation of ajus cogens rule. 149 
VII CONCLUSIONS: CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW? 
68. The Prosecutor's Office at the ICTY has concluded that legally and evidentially 
there are insufficient grounds for further investigation into allegations of War Crimes 
by NATO during Operation Allied Force. Despite that finding there is continued 
debate over the lawfulness of some of the incidents in which civilians were killed, 
with some commentators concluding that there were violations of the laws and 
customs of war. If any of these incidents were war crimes then the doctrine of 
command responsibility will extend criminal liability to superiors who have failed in 
their duty to prevent or punish. This liability could extend all the way up the chain of 
command to the Head of State. 
69. Any prosecution against Bill Clinton and Tony Blair for NATO war cnmes 
would face two obstacles: satisfying the legal tests for command responsibility, and 
overcoming their sovereign immunity. Both men satisfy the first two tests under the 
doctrine of command responsibility, the existence of the superior-subordinate 
relationship and the requisite knowledge requirement. It is in establishing the last 
element, the failure to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or punish 
offences, that any prosecution would encounter difficulties. One problem is the 
complexities that a multinational coalition brings to both the definition of the 
superior-subordinate relationship and the quantification of necessary and reasonable 
measures . These difficulties have been adverted to in this paper but not resolved. The 
second problem is one of proof. There is very little evidence on what internal NA TO 
investigations were conducted, and what, if any, national investigations were 
conducted into these incidents. Both the United States and United Kingdom have well 
organised legal services within their defence forces, and it is likely that if well 
conducted investigations concluded on reasonable grounds that the incidents were 
149 Bianchi, above nl32, section 3. 
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lawful, then that would be sufficient to satisfy necessary and reasonable measures in 
h . . 150 t zs instance. 
70. The second obstacle, the doctrine of sovereign immunity, 1s the more 
formidable. This doctrine has been eroded over the course of the last hundred years, 
but it is in the last decade that we have seen the international community challenge it 
in its unqualified form. The conviction of the Prime Minister of Rwanda, the 
proceedings against Pinochet, the arrest and impending trial of Milosevic are 
important instances of moves to end impunity. The Pinochet analysis draws a 
distinction between acting and former Heads of State, and the implication of that 
analysis is that a former Head of State's substantive or procedural immunity ratione 
materiae will not protect them from individual criminal liability for international 
crimes. For current Heads of State the international custom is still unsatisfactory. 
Their ratione personae still acts as an absolute bar to proceedings by domestic courts, 
though the principle of individual responsibility defeats their substantive immunity. 
The position may be different for an international tribunal; there the immunity ratione 
personae may not bar proceedings, though this is still untested. This position is 
unsatisfactory as it is an encouragement for these leaders to cling to power by any and 
all means, as their immunity is lost once they lose power. 
71. And what of Bill Clinton and Tony Blair? It is a timely reminder to all 
superiors, civilian and military, that they bear a positive duty to prevent and punish 
war crimes. If they do not do so they can be, and judging by recent developments may 
well be, held criminally liable. Some of the incidents in the NATO campaign are of 
questionable legality, but on the current evidence it seems unlikely that Clinton or 
Blair could be held criminally liable. 
150 As noted above the fact that the lawfulness is ambiguous, and the different legal analyses of the 
OTP and other legal commentators reaching contrary conclusions, suggests that these offences are 
borderline cases. Where the offences were clearly unlawful a superior would not be able to rely on a 
sham investigation to deflect criminal liability. 
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